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There has been limited success applying the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) in assigning
intellectual property damages due to the difficulty of applying it to the specific facts of the case.
Because of this, parties are not taking advantage of Georgia-Pacific factor fifteen. The intent
of this paper is to bring clarity to the NBS so it can be applied to the facts of a case. This
paper normalizes the NBS and provides a methodology for determining the bargaining weight in
Nash’s solution. Several examples are shown demonstrating the use of this normalized form, and a
nomograph is added for computational ease.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In U.S. patent litigation, there are two predominate
ways to compensate a licensor when a firm infringes on
the licensor’s intellectual property. One way is to cal-
culate the profit that was lost due to the infringement.
The other way is to designate a reasonable royalty. A
reasonable royalty is defined as a royalty that is assigned
to the licensor for the use of their intellectual property
by the licensee that is fair to both parties [1].
Assigning a reasonable royalty is especially difficult in
a dispute situation because of the difficulty of an arbiter
or court to attribute a royalty that is perceived as fair
for both parties. A famous District Court case Georgia-
Pacific vs. United States Plywood Corp1 demonstrated
the complexity of assigning a reasonable royalty in litiga-
tion involving patents. As a result of the case, the Dis-
trict Court established fifteen guidelines for determining
a reasonable royalty. However, guideline fifteen allowed
for the use of a hypothetical license negotiation at the
time the infringement began. This guideline implies that
the NBS could be used as a justification for assigning a
reasonable royalty.
In recent court cases, some judges have steered clear
from using the NBS because parties often do not apply it
to the specific facts of the case2. This has caused judges
∗Electronic address: dkryskow@wayne.edu
1 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp.
1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.1970), mod. and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971)
2 Notable cases include: VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,
767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google
Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111 N.D. Cal. 2011; Suffolk Techs. LLC
v. Aol Inc., No. 1:12cv625, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64630 (E.D.
Va. Apr. 12, 2013); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Xo Communs.,
LLC Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-720-JAG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17802 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2018)
to criticize the NBS solution when determining a rea-
sonable royalty [2–4]. Because Nash’s solution is often
not tailored to the specific facts of the case, parties are
not taking full advantage of the NBS. Another reason
for critisim, is the NBS has not been easy to calculate
and easy to interpret so that a court or jury can easily
understand it [5].3 In order to demystify the NBS, we in-
troduce certain normalizations that provide for a simple
calculation of damages. These normalizations make the
NBS a powerful tool to value intellectual property and
provide guidance in assigning proper compensation.
First, this paper applies Nash’s solution in a more busi-
ness friendly manner by using terminology that is com-
mon on corporate balance sheets. Additionally, this pa-
per normalizes each term in the NBS by the operating
income. By doing this, the parties can better interpret
the NBS and do not need to know exact dollar amounts
when determining a royalty. The Choi and Weinstein [6]
Two Supplier World (TSW) model is the basis for our
modifications.
Second, Nash’s original solution assigns equal bargain-
ing strength to each party. However, this equal bar-
gaining strength assumption is, in general, not realis-
tic [7]. This paper shows Nash’s solution with an arbi-
trary bargaining weight to account for unequal bargain-
ing strengths and presents a methodology for determining
those strengths.
Third, a nomograph of the NBS is supplied to make it
easy for parties to graphically obtain a reasonable royalty
using a simple straight edge. Nomographs are useful to
3 [5] gives two reasons why courts are reluctant to use the NBS:
”First, damages experts often use the NBS improperly, failing to
apply the specific facts of the case to their calculations.[internal
citation omitted] Second, damages experts typically fail to ad-
equately explain the NBS to courts and juries.[internal citation
omitted]”
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2provide visualization so the NBS can be better explained.
By taking these steps, parties can take advantage of
Georgia-Pacific factor fifteen by allowing the NBS to be
tailored to the specific facts of the case. This paper is
an attempt to bring clarity to the use of the NBS, so
the royalty that is assigned is both legally defensible and
mutually beneficial.
II. ELEMENTS OF A LICENSING BARGAIN
The NBS is recast into a simple normalized form using
common terms found on a corporate balance sheet with
the intent to introduce common business terminology.
A. Operating Revenue
The operating revenue is the revenue generated from
the use of the intellectual property and is denoted by OR.
It does not include income from unusual events or income
that is not primary due to the use of the intellectual
property.
B. Operating Cost
The operating cost is the expense associated with pro-
ducing and selling the product incorporating the intellec-
tual property. This is defined as OC and does not include
costs from non-primary sources or unusual events.
C. Operating Income
The operating income, or profit, is determined by sub-
tracting the operating cost from the operating revenue:
OI = OR−OC . In formulating the asymmetric NBS, we
denote the operating income of licensor and licensee to
be pi1 and pi2, respectively where the total profit in the
system is OI .
D. Operating Margin
The operating margin, OM , is operating income di-
vided by operating revenue and is expressed as OM =
OI/OR.
E. Royalty
The royalty is what the licensee will pay the licensor
for the use of the intellectual property. There are two
common ways to calculate a royalty. One way is assign-
ing a royalty on each unit, and the other is obtaining a
royalty based off a percentage of revenue [8] by multiply-
ing the revenue with the royalty rate, r. In this paper,
we focus solely on a royalty based off revenue.
F. Disagreement Payoffs
A disagreement payoff is the opportunity cost of mak-
ing the deal. In other words, disagreement payoffs are
profits that come from a hypothetical negotiation that
did not happen but could have happened if the parties did
not agree to a deal. Disagreement payoffs are normally
expressed as monetary amounts and are represented in
this paper by d1 and d2 for licensor and licensee respec-
tively. However, for computational ease, we normalize
the disagreement payoffs to the operating income, and
these are expressed as d†1 and d
†
2 for the licensor and li-
censee respectively. A normalized disagreement payoff
equal to one implies a particular party is indifferent be-
tween making the deal and not making the deal since the
party could earn the same amount of profit regardless.
For example, if d†1 = 1.0, then the licensor is just as good
at making the deal than not making the deal. For empha-
sis, a normalized disagreement payoff of d†2 = 0.5 means
that the licensee’s opportunity cost is half the profit than
a deal with the licensor can make. Each parties’ normal-
ized disagreement payoffs can vary between zero and one.
However, the sum of the normalized disagreement pay-
offs cannot exceed one or a deal cannot be made since
there is not enough profit to give each party their op-
portunity cost. The disagreement point is denoted by
d† =
(
d†1, d
†
2
)
.
G. Bargaining Weight
A bargaining weight quantifies the amount of influence
each party has in the negotiation and determines how
the parties split the surplus from making the deal. The
bargaining weight for the licensor is α, and the bargaining
weight for the licensee is 1-α, where the weight is between
zero and one. Each party has a perception of how they
view their own and each other’s bargaining strengths in a
negotiation. The bigger a party’s bargaining weight, the
more influence that party has in the negotiation. This
means the party with the larger weight will obtain more
surplus from making the deal. When applying the NBS,
it has been common practice to assign each party a weight
equal to 1/2, which implies that each party has the same
influence in the negotiation [9].
3III. THE ASYMMETRIC NASH BARGAINING
SOLUTION
John Nash developed the NBS, which provides a
method for two parties who enter in a profit making
agreement to determine how to optimally share those
profits [10]. Nash’s solution determines how much more
the parties can make if they cooperate and equally divide
the surplus. The axioms that satisfy the classic NBS are:
1. Individual rationality: No party will agree to
accept a payoff lower than the one guaranteed to
him under disagreement.
2. Pareto optimality: None of the parties can be
made better off without making at least one party
worse off.
3. Symmetry: If the parties are indistinguishable,
the agreement should not discriminate between
them.
4. Affine transformation invariance: An affine
transformation of the payoff and disagreement
point should not alter the outcome of the bargain-
ing process.
5. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: All
threats the parties might make have been ac-
counted for in the disagreement point.
The introduction of a bargaining weight into the NBS
affords the opportunity for the parties to be distinguish-
able when d†1 = d
†
2 (potentially violating symmetry), and
this is known as the asymmetric NBS [11]. The bargain-
ing weight can be influenced by other forces or tactics
employed by the parties which can be independent of the
disagreement payoffs. These forces should be accounted
for because they ultimately affect how the surplus is di-
vided4.
The asymmetric NBS is formed from the constrained
maximization problem:
max
pi1,pi2
(pi1 − d1)α (pi2 − d2)1−α (1)
Subject to the following conditions:
pi1 ≥ d1 (2)
4 [11] states: ”However, the outcome of a bargaining situation may
be influenced by other forces (or, variables), such as the tactics
employed by the bargainers, the procedure through which negoti-
ations are conducted, the information structure and the players’
discount rates. However, none of these forces seem to affect the
two objects upon which the NBS is defined [the disagreement
payoffs], and yet it seems reasonable not to rule out the pos-
sibility that such forces may have a significant impact on the
bargaining outcome.”
pi2 ≥ d2 (3)
pi1 + pi2 ≤ OI (4)
Maximum occurs when:
(1− α) (pi∗1 − d1) = α (pi∗2 − d2) (5)
pi∗1 + pi
∗
2 = OI (6)
Solving for optimal partition of the profits gives the
final result:
pi∗1 = d1 + α (OI − d1 − d2) (7a)
pi∗2 = d2 + (1− α) (OI − d1 − d2) (7b)
The interpretation of Eq. (7) is that the parties first
agree to give each other their respective disagreement
payoffs, and split the remaining profit according to their
bargaining strength.
A. Normalized Royalty Model
In order to make TSW model more practical, we modi-
fied Eq. (7) to introduce a royalty based on a percentage
of revenue. Moreover, by simple algebraic manipulation,
we can re-cast Eq. (7) where every term is normalized
by the operating income and varies between zero and
one. Having each term normalized is powerful because
the parties do not need to think in terms of specific dol-
lar amounts. Instead, the parties can think in terms of
fractions of profit.
We refer to the licensor as party 1 and the licensee as
party 2. Under these assumptions, we derive the payoffs
for party 1 and 2 as:
pi∗1
OI
=
r OR
OI
=
r
OM
(8)
pi∗2
OI
=
OR −OC − rOR
OI
= 1− r
OM
(9)
Additionally defining:
d†1 =
d1
OI
0 ≤ d†1 ≤ 1 (10)
d†2 =
d2
OI
0 ≤ d†2 ≤ 1 (11)
4Substituting Eqs. (8), and (10)–(11) into Eq. (7a), we
obtain the result for the optimal NBS with an arbitrary
bargaining weight for party 1:
r
OM
= d†1 + α
(
1− d†1 − d†2
)
(12)
Where:
0 ≤ d†1 + d†2 ≤ 1 (13)
In order to maintain Pareto efficiency, Eq. (12) must
satisfy the following [12]:
∂r
∂d†1
> 0 (14a)
∂r
∂d†2
< 0 (14b)
The interpretation of Eq. (14) is that for a small posi-
tive change in party 1’s disagreement payoff, the royalty
should increase, while for a small positive change in party
2’s disagreement payoff the royalty should decrease - that
is, we cannot make one party better off without making
the other party worse off.
IV. ESTIMATION OF THE BARGAINING
WEIGHT
The bargaining weight, α, represents how the parties
perceive their own bargaining strength and how they see
the other’s bargaining strength. To account for all the
perceptions of bargaining strength, we introduce the pa-
rameter, Pm,n, and it is defined as party m’s bargain-
ing strength as perceived by party n. For example, P1,2
is how the licensee perceives the licensor’s bargaining
strength.
Making the simple assumption that the bargaining
strength of each party is the average of their own per-
ception and the perception of the other party, we can
define the following mathematical ansatz using two dif-
ferent equations to describe the bargaining strength of
party 1:
α1 =
1
2
[P1,1 + P1,2] (15a)
α2 = 1− 1
2
[P2,1 + P2,2] (15b)
Averaging Eqs. (15a)–(15b), we obtain the complete ex-
pression for the bargaining weight of party 1:
α ≡ 1
2
[α1 + α2]
=
1
2
+
1
4
[P1,1 + P1,2 − P2,1 − P2,2] 0 ≤ Pm,n ≤ 1
(16)
FIG. 1: Family of Nash Bargaining Solutions Given Equal
Bargaining Power
Eq. (16) is critically important because we now have
a simple procedure in defining the bargaining weight of
party 1. By formally defining the bargaining weight, we
can incorporate the bargaining strengths of each party to
fit the particular facts of a case.
There are three basic approaches when calculating a
bargaining weight. One approach is to treat α as function
that is independent of the disagreement payoffs. The
second approach is to make the bargaining weight strictly
a function of the disagreement payoffs. The third is a
mixture of the first two approaches.
A. The Classic Nash Bargaining Solution
When P1,1 + P1,2 = P2,1 + P2,2 in Eq. (16), then α =
1/2 and we obtain the classic symmetric NBS:
r
OM
=
1
2
(
1 + d†1 − d†2
)
(17)
Fig. 1 presents the family of solutions of Eq. (17).
Note that the lines of equal d†2 are linear and equidistant
from each other. Also note that the lines are not the
same length due to the constraint of Eq. (13).
V. DISCUSSION
In this section we present some hypothetical situations
to demonstrate the use of the NBS. Since the assignment
of a party’s perception of bargaining strength to a partic-
ular Pm,n can be somewhat arbitrary, the examples given
5in this section are for illustration only. In the end, it is
the job of the parties to provide a careful assessment of
each of their perceptions and incorporate them properly
into Eq. (16). By choosing these perceptions, the NBS
can be applied to the specific facts of the case.
A. Estimation of Bargaining Strengths
Independent of the Disagreement Payoffs
We demonstrate the use of Eq. (16) by a simple hypo-
thetical negotiation involving bargaining strengths inde-
pendent of the disagreement payoffs.
1. Number of Competitors as Strength
The bargaining strength of party 1 is dependent on
the relation between the hypothetical number of licen-
sors and licensees in the market [13]. This is because if
party 1 has a wide range of options to sell its intellec-
tual property, then party 1 is presumably less worried
about making a deal with party 2 because it can credibly
walk away. Therefore, if party 1 can sell its intellectual
property to multiple licensees, we expect party 1 to have
more bargaining strength. Conversely, if party 2 can li-
cense an acceptable substitute, then party 1’s bargaining
strength will diminish. The following equation is driven
by the ratio of the number of licensors to the number of
licensees in the relevant market [13]. The component of
party 1’s bargaining strength as derived from the number
of licensors and licensees in the market is:
PL1,n = 1−min
[
1,
Licensors
Licensees
]
(18)
The perception is assigned as P1,n because either party
may perceive (18) as a component of party 1’s bargaining
strength.
2. Market Share as Strength
In business, market share is regarded as the essential
element of dominance [14]. As a result, valuing a com-
ponent of party 1’s bargaining strength by the amount
of market share, s, is attractive as opposed to a mea-
surement of potential profits. Using potential profits as
a measurement of bargaining strength may not be ap-
pealing because profits are highly variable from year to
year while market share is relatively constant over longer
periods of time. Additionally, courts often measure the
dominance of firms by market share rather than prof-
its [15]. Therefore, another measurement of bargaining
strength is to determine how much market share party
2 would gain as a result of the deal. The component
of party 1’s bargaining strength as derived from market
share is:
PS1,n =
s
S
0 ≤ s ≤ S (19)
In Eq. (19), S denotes that fraction of the total market
party 2 realistically desires.
3. Life of the Patent as Strength
Another perception of strength can be the time left un-
til the patent expires. Presumably, party 1 is in a strong
bargaining position when the patent has been recently is-
sued but is in a weak bargaining position when the patent
is about to expire. Let the life of the patent be denoted
by T and the time that has elapsed since issue by t. The
component of party 1’s bargaining strength as derived
from patent life is:
PT1,n = 1−
t
T
0 ≤ t ≤ T (20)
4. Example
In this hypothetical example, party 1 perceives its bar-
gaining strengths, with equal weight, to be the lack of
acceptable substitutes for its patent and the potential
market share that the patent can bring to party 2. Party
2 perceives party 1’s bargaining strength as only the life
of the patent. Party 2 has a unique manufacturing base
that can take full advantage of party 1’s patent and per-
ceives its own bargaining strength as P2,2 = 2/3. Party 1
is well aware of party 2’s unique manufacturing capabil-
ities but only perceives party 2’s strength as P2,1 = 1/2.
Substituting each perception into Eq. (16), we obtain:
α =
1
2
+
1
4
[
PL1,1 + P
S
1,1
2
+ PT1,2 −
1
2
− 2
3
]
(21)
Eq. (21) can now be substituted into Eq. (12) to
obtain the royalty for party 1.
B. Estimation of Bargaining Strengths Using
Disagreement Payoffs
Disagreement payoffs can be a reasonable measure
of bargaining strength because the parties can poten-
tially walk away from the negotiation and make a deal
somewhere else based on the disagreement payoffs alone.
Therefore, α can be a function of each party’s disagree-
ment payoff. This approach requires the least amount
6FIG. 2: Family of Nash Bargaining Solutions for Table I Case
1
of information but requires the parties to determine a
functional form of α
(
d†1, d
†
2
)
that adequately represents
the negotiation. For a standard of fairness, we stipulate
that when d†1 = d
†
2, the parties should split the profits
equally, which implies that we are reintroducing symme-
try. It is possible to construct an α
(
d†1, d
†
2
)
that reintro-
duces symmetry and yet provides for variability in the
bargaining weight.
Cases 1-3 in Table I are examples of symmetric bar-
gaining weights driven by the parties’ disagreement pay-
offs.
1. Case 1
In Case 1 of Table I, each party assumes that its
bargaining strength is equal to its disagreement payoff.
Moreover, each party agrees that the other party’s bar-
gaining strength is its own disagreement payoff. Substi-
tuting Case 1 of Table I into Eq. (12), we obtain:
r
OM
=
d†2
2 − d†1
2
+ 2
(
d†1 − d†2
)
+ 1
2
(22)
Eq. (22) shows a quadratic dependence on both d†1 and
d†2, and this dependence is illustrated in Fig. 2. Note that
a party is penalized to a much greater extent for having
a weak disagreement payoff position over the classic NBS
of Fig. 1.
FIG. 3: Family of Nash Bargaining Solutions for Table I Case
2
2. Case 2
In Case 2 of Table I, each party assumes that its bar-
gaining strength is equal to its fraction of the total dis-
agreement payoff position d†1 + d
†
2. Moreover, each party
agrees that the other party’s bargaining strength is its
own fraction of the total disagreement payoff position.
Substituting Case 2 of Table I into Eq. (12), we obtain:
r
OM
=
d†1
d†1 + d
†
2
(23)
Interestingly, the payoff for each party is the party’s
own bargaining weight. Moreover, the solution is inde-
pendent of OI , which makes this a non-cooperative bar-
gain and is equivalent to a limiting case of the Rubinstein
model5, where the parties take turns in making an offer
until agreement is secured.6
5 In [11] the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium solution, where the time
limt between offers ∆ → 0, is presented in terms of discount
rates (rA, rB) where d
†
1/d
†
2 = rB/rA. The payoff pair obtained
through perpetural disagrement, the Impass Point, is (IA, IB) =(
d†1, d
†
2
)
. See Corollary 3.1 and Definition 3.1.
6 [11] discusses the Rubinstein model where the parties take turns
in making an offer until agreement is secured. ”...Another in-
sight is that a party’s bargaining power depends on the relative
magnitude of the parties’ respective costs of haggling, with the
absolute magnitudes of these costs being irrelevant to the bar-
gaining outcome. ...In a boxing match, the winner is the rela-
7TABLE I: Three Cases of Symmetric Disagreement Payoff Driven Bargaining Weights
Case P1,1 P1,2 P2,1 P2,2 α
(
d†1, d
†
2
)
1 d†1 d
†
1 d
†
2 d
†
2
1
2
+
d
†
1−d
†
2
2
2
d
†
1
d
†
1+d
†
2
d
†
1
d
†
1+d
†
2
d
†
2
d
†
1+d
†
2
d
†
2
d
†
1+d
†
2
d
†
1
d
†
1+d
†
2
3
d
†
1
d
†
1+d
†
2
d
†
1
d
†
1+d
†
2
1−d†1
2−d†1−d
†
2
1−d†1
2−d†1−d
†
2
d
†
1
2
+
(
2 d
†
2−3
)
d
†
1+d
†
2
2−d†2
2
(
d
†
1+d
†
2
)(
−2+d†1+d
†
2
)
Fig. 3 shows the family of solutions for Eq. (23). Note
the rapid collapse to zero of party 1’s royalty for any
constant d†2 as d
†
1 approaches zero.
3. Case 3
In Case 3, we present an example where a party’s bar-
gaining strength (party 2) depends on the weakness of
his opponent. As in the previous examples, all parties
agree on each other’s bargaining strength. Substituting
Case 3 of Table I into Eq. (12), we obtain:
r
OM
=
d†2
2 − d†1
2 − 2d†2 + d†1 + 1
2− d†1 − d†2
(24)
Fig. 4 shows the family of solutions for Eq. (24). The
figure shows the same quadratic dependence as Case 1
Fig. 2 where the lines of constant d†2 get closer together
as d†2 becomes dominant. Party 1’s bargaining advantage
has increased from Case 2 for small d†1 because party 2’s
strength is derived from party 1’s weakness and not its
own strength as in Case 2.
C. Estimation of Bargaining Strength Using
Combinations
We can combine perceptions using both constants and
functions involving the disagreement payoffs. This im-
plies that the parties’ perceptions can be both indepen-
dent or dependent on the disagreement payoffs. However,
there are cases when combinations of perceptions are not
Pareto efficient, and we examine this next.
1. Solutions That Violate Pareto Efficiency
When α is a function of the disagreement payoffs, there
can be combinations of perceptions that violate Pareto
tively stronger of the two boxers; the absolute strengths of the
boxers are irrelevant to the outcome.”
FIG. 4: Family of Nash Bargaining Solutions for Table I Case
3
efficiency in a part of the solution space, and Fig. 5 is one
such example. Substituting the following hypothetical α
into Eq. (12), we obtain Fig. 5:
α
(
d†1, d
†
2
)
=
1
2
+
1
4
[
d†1 +
1
3
− d
†
1
d†1 + d
†
2
−
(
1− d†1
)]
(25)
From Fig. 5, we can see that the solution space is not
Pareto efficient everywhere because when both d†1 and d
†
2
are small, party 1 will receive a lower royalty for a small
increase in d†1, which is counter-intuitive.
It is easily shown that the royalty in Fig. 5 violates
Eq. (14) when d†2 is small. The reason for this violation
is that the specification of P2,1 causes party 2’s strength
as perceived by party 1 to be lower as party 1’s disagree-
ment payoff lowers. This influences a small section of the
solution space to violate Pareto efficiency.
8FIG. 5: Family of Nash Bargaining Solutions With Regions
That Violate Pareto Efficiency
VI. NOMOGRAPHS
In order to make it easy to compute a royalty using
the asymmetric NBS, a nomograph was constructed (see
Fig. 6) with PyNomo [16, 17].7 A nomograph is a dia-
gram that is a graphical representation of a mathemati-
cal function. It allows for quick computation without the
need to substitute numbers into a formula. Nomographs
also provide visualization as to how the function behaves
so the NBS can be easily explained.
To use the nomograph, pick any three variables on the
graph and draw a straight line to get the fourth vari-
able. For example, suppose that the normalized dis-
agreement payoffs are d†1 = 0.20 and d
†
2 = 0.30. Ad-
ditionally, suppose α = 0.40. Using a straight edge, a
line is drawn from α = 0.40 to a point on the grid where
(d†1,d
†
2) = (0.20, 0.30). The royalty for party 1 is read off
the corresponding scale.
A blank nomograph is provided in the appendix.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this model of the asymmetric NBS, there are three
essential variables needed to obtain a royalty. They are
the disagreement payoffs of both party 1 and party 2,
and the bargaining weight. At a minimum, the parties
7 Type 9 General Determinant was used.
FIG. 6: The use of the nomograph is demonstrated with d†1 =
0.20, d†2 = 0.30, and α = 0.40 to solve for r/OM = 0.40.
should have a good understanding of the licensed prod-
uct’s operating margin if a royalty rate is to be com-
puted along with the need to take educated guesses on
the disagreement payoffs of both parties. Various ex-
amples were given to demonstrate how the bargaining
strengths of each party can be incorporated into the bar-
gaining weight, and these individual bargaining strengths
can be used to apply the NBS to the specific facts of the
case. Although Georgia-Pacific factor fifteen is the ba-
sis for this analysis, the other fourteen factors could also
be used to obtain the normalized disagreement payoffs
and to choose the bargaining strengths. Finally, we have
produced a nomograph for the parties to make a quick
calculation of the asymmetric NBS to solve for a reason-
able royalty.
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FIG. 7: Blank Nomograph
